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compartmentalization of components within the
cell, and with temporal profiles of activation, to
obtain a more comprehensive picture of the
functionalorganizationofacell.Still,distancein
chemical space (i.e., number of links between
two distal nodes) is likely to be a major deter-
minant of information processing that regulates
phenotypic behavior.
The maps for individual ligands or cellular
machines show distinct patterns of motifs. Com-
binations of ligands will likely produce many
more patterns of connectivity. Thus, a cellular
system may not be a single network but rather an
ensemble of network configurations that are
evoked by the stimuli-induced activation of var-
ious parts of the system. Identifying these network
configurations and the functions they evoke is
likely to provide more complete descriptions of
how molecular interactions lead to cellular
choices between homeostasis and plasticity.
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Highly pathogenic avian influenza A (subtype H5N1) is threatening to cause a
human pandemic of potentially devastating proportions. We used a stochastic
influenza simulation model for rural Southeast Asia to investigate the ef-
fectiveness of targeted antiviral prophylaxis, quarantine, and pre-vaccination
in containing an emerging influenza strain at the source. If the basic
reproductive number (R0) was below 1.60, our simulations showed that a
prepared response with targeted antivirals would have a high probability of
containing the disease. In that case, an antiviral agent stockpile on the order
of 100,000 to 1 million courses for treatment and prophylaxis would be
sufficient. If pre-vaccination occurred, then targeted antiviral prophylaxis
could be effective for containing strains with an R0 as high as 2.1.
Combinations of targeted antiviral prophylaxis, pre-vaccination, and quaran-
tine could contain strains with an R0 as high as 2.4.
T h ew o r l dm a yb eo nt h eb r i n ko fa ni n f l u e n z a
pandemic (1–4). Avian influenza A (subtype
H5N1) is causing widespread outbreaks among
poultry in Southeast (SE) Asia, with sporadic
transmission from birds to humans (5)a n d
limited probable human-to-human transmission
(6). Should an avian virus reassort with a
human virus, such as influenza A subtype
H3N2, within a dually infected human host or
reassort in a nonhuman mammalian species, or
ifmutationofthevirusoccurs,theresultingnew
variant could be capable of sustained human-to-
human transmission. The outbreak among
humans would then spread worldwide via the
global transportation network more rapidly than
adequate supplies of vaccine matched to the
new variant could be manufactured and distrib-
uted(1, 7). Thepressing publichealthquestions
are whether and how we can contain the spread
of an emerging strain at the source or at least
slow the initial spread to give time for vaccine
development. We used a discrete-time sto-
chastic simulation model of influenza spread
within a structured geographically distributed
population of 500,000 people in SE Asia to
compare the effectiveness of various interven-
tion strategies against a new strain of influenza.
Here we examine the effectiveness of the tar-
geted use of influenza antiviral agents (8–12),
quarantine, and pre-vaccination with a poorly
matched,low-efficacy vaccineincontaining the
spread of the disease at the source.
We used information about rural SE Asia
(13, 14) to construct the model population. Our
goal was to represent the contact connectivity
of a typical rural SE Asian population. The
model population of 500,000 people was
distributed across a space of 5625 km2, yielding
a density of 89/km2, which is approximately
the population density of rural SE Asia (13).
The 500,000 people were partitioned into 36
geographic localities. This model is an ex-
tension of a model used to simulate inter-
ventions against pandemic influenza in the
United States (12).
The model Esee the supporting online ma-
terial (SOM) for details^ represents the number
of close and casual contacts that a typical person
makes in the course of a day. The age and
household size distributions of the population
arebasedontheThai2000census(13). Manyof
the mixing group sizes and distributions are
based on a social network study of the Nang
Rong District in rural Thailand (14). We con-
structed the social network for contacts sufficient
to transmit influenza as a large set of connected
mixing groups. The close contact groups consist
of households, household clusters, preschool
groups, schools, and workplaces; and the casual
contact groups consist of other social settings
(such as markets, shops, and temples) and a
single regional 40-bed hospital. All people can
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households, whereas children mix in preschool
groups or schools according to their age and the
probability that they are still in school. Children
are assigned to schools across the geographic
space according to the Nang Rong study. Adults
mix in workplaces according to a distance func-
tion that distributes them across the geographic
space informed by the Nang Rong study and
national migration statistics (15, 16). One con-
cern for containment is that infected people
might leave the modeled 500,000-person rural
area. We estimate that the daily probability
that a person will leave (escape) the area is on
the order of 10j3 (15). The population struc-
ture and the resulting social network graphs
and statistics are given in the SOM.
The natural history of influenza (Fig. 1A)
has been relatively invariant over the past two
pandemics and during the interpandemic pe-
riod since 1968 (12, 17–20). Calibration of the
model requires information about both the
relative and absolute magnitudes of the age-
specific illness attack rates. Because of un-
certainty about the relative age-specific illness
attack rates for a future influenza pandemic
in SE Asia, we calibrated the epidemic to a
pattern that falls between two extremes. At
one extreme, children would have a much
higher illness attack rate than adults, the pat-
tern observed during the 1957–1958 A (sub-
type H2N2) Asian influenza pandemic in the
United States (17, 21, 22). At the other ex-
treme, all age groups would have roughly
the same illness attack rates, the pattern ob-
served during the 1968–1969 A (H3N2) Hong
Kong influenza pandemic in the United States
(17, 22–24). The pattern for interpandemic in-
fluenza in SE Asia appears to be more like the
A (H2N2) pattern (25). We used the pattern
shown in Fig. 1B.
The magnitude of the illness attack rates will
depend on the unknown transmissibility of the
new strain. The overall illness attack rate for the
pastAsian and HongKong pandemics wasabout
33% in the first wave. We calibrated the model
with a target overall illness attack rate of 33%,
corresponding to a basic reproductive number
(R0) (the average number of secondary infec-
tions caused by a single typical infectious
individual in a completely susceptible popula-
tion) of 1.4 (see the SOM). By varying the per-
contact probability of infection in the model, we
alter the R0. Figure 1B shows the age-specific
attack rates at R0 values ranging from 1.1 to 2.4.
For calibration to historical attack rates, influ-
enza was introduced by randomly assigning 12
initial infectives. We simulated the emergence
of a new influenza strain by introducing a single
randomly assigned infective.
Intervention is triggered by the first case (that
is, symptomatic infection), with a delay of 7, 14,
or 21 days to implementation. This delay can be
interpreted as a delay in recognition of illness, a
delay in implementation of intervention, initia-
tion of transmission by more than one initial in-
fection,oracombinationofthesethreefactors.A
sensitivity analysis considers delays up to 56
days (fig. S14). Once intervention begins, inter-
vention in additional localities is implemented
1dayafterthefirstcaseintheaffectedlocality.
Targeted antiviral prophylaxis (TAP) is
carried out by treating identified index cases
(thefirstsymptomaticillnessinamixinggroup)
and offering prophylaxis only to the contacts
of these index cases in predefined close con-
tact groups(12); namely, households, neighbor-
hood clusters, preschool groups, schools, and
workplaces. Index cases are therapeutically
treated the day after the onset of illness, and
prophylaxis of contacts begins at the same
time, both being given a single course of
oseltamivir. A susceptible individual may re-
ceive subsequent courses if exposed to further
index cases. We assume that a certain percent,
varied in a sensitivity analysis, of household
(preschool) index cases could be ascertained
and that all their other household (preschool)
members would receive prophylaxis (fig. S11).
For index cases in a school or workplace, only
Fig. 1. Basic model parameter distributions. (A) Modeled
natural history of influenza. Newly infected people pass
through the latent state (mean, 1.2 days) and infectious state
(mean, 4.1 days), after which they recover with immunity or
die. We model the incubation period as slightly longer than
the latent period, so that people who are infected develop
influenza symptoms on average 1.9 days after infection if they
develop symptoms at all (17, 18). The probability distributions
of the latent, incubation, and infectious periods are shown.
We assume that 67% of infected people develop influenza
symptoms and 33% will be asymptomatic. We further assume
that asymptomatic people are half as infectious as those with
influenza symptoms. Additionally, this model allows for
people to withdraw from all of their mixing groups except
the family unit if they become ill. (B) Illness attack rates (the
final proportion that become ill) by age group and R0.( C) For
epidemics with no interventions, the probabilities of no cases,
a small epidemic with at least one secondary infected person
(e1 case per 1000), and a large epidemic (91 case per 1000),
as a function of R0. Also, the average number of cases per
1000 people for the latter two types of epidemics.
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group would receive prophylaxis. We used cur-
rent estimates of the antiviral efficacy (AVE)
of oseltamivir (26–29) (see the SOM).
The primary difficulty in TAP would be the
identification of index cases. Because TAP is
aimed at predefined close contact groups, the
identification of potential TAP recipients would
be less difficult than in classical contact tracing.
An alternative and less resource-intensive strat-
egy would be geographically targeted anti-
viral prophylaxis (GTAP), also known as ring
prophylaxis. In this strategy, once an influenza
case is identified in a locality, then a percent-
age, varied in a sensitivity analysis (fig. S12),
of people in an entire locality are given one
course of oseltamivir.
Household quarantine, like GTAP, is im-
plemented within localities. The first case in
a locality triggers a quarantine policy. Every
case and a certain percentage of susceptible
people restrict their movement to within their
household and their neighborhood cluster. Be-
cause quarantined people would have more
contact with their household and neighbor-
hood contacts, the contact probabilities within
households and household clusters are doubled
for quarantined people.
A human influenza A (H5N1) vaccine is
currentlybeing tested(7) and may be available,
but could be poorly matched to the emerging
strain and thus be of low efficacy. For the model
scenarios that use vaccination, we assume that
pre-vaccination takes place long enough be-
fore the pandemic that vaccinated people can
develop immunity. We assume a low vaccine
efficacy for susceptibility (VES)( 30) of 0.30
and a vaccine efficacy for infectiousness (VEI)
of 0.50. We carried out a sensitivity analysis
on VEI (fig. S19).
We consider an epidemic to be contained if
there are fewer than 500 cases in the 500,000-
person community (e1 per 1000). The contain-
ment proportion is the proportion of simulations
in which the attack rate is e1 per 1000. Another
measure of how well we have contained the
epidemic is the number of infected people who
travel out of the 500,000-person community
over the course of the epidemic. If this number
is very low or even zero, we have effectively
contained spread at the source. The number of
cases per 1000 people in the population is
another measure of success of the intervention.
Given an initial person infected with the
newly emergent influenza strain, there are three
possible outcomes: (i) no further people are
infected; (ii) there is a small epidemic, between
1and 500total cases (e1 per 1000); or(iii)there
is a large epidemic (91 case per 1000 people).
The relative probabilities of these three out-
comes as well as the average size of a large
epidemic vary with R0 (Fig. 1C).
Figure 2A shows a typical realization of a
large epidemic due to a single initial infective
at R0 0 1.4, with no intervention, as well as the
average times for intervention initiation. On
average, the first symptomatic case appeared 4
days after the initial infection, with interven-
tion initiation times on average 11, 18, or 25
days after the initial infection. Figure 2B
shows a typical realization of an epidemic
contained with 90% GTAP. Movies 1 to 3 in
the SOM show the geographic spread of the
epidemic with and without intervention.
Figure 3 gives bar plots of the results for
the different intervention strategies and values
of R0. Table 1 gives numbers for the results for
R0 values of 1.4 and 1.7. The measures of
containment did not vary much if intervention
was initiated 7, 14, or 21 days after the first
case, so we give results just for the 14-day
delay, followed by a sensitivity analysis of the
effect of further delay (fig. S14). When R0 0
1.1, just above threshold, all of the interven-
tions work well. Both 80% TAP and 90%
GTAP would be effective in containing pan-
demic influenza at the source if R0 e 1.4. If
R0 Q 1.7, then neither 80% TAP nor 90%
GTAP is consistently effective in containing
the epidemic, and 300,000 to 350,000 courses
of oseltamivir would be needed. Thus, for these
interventions singly, a containment threshold
exists somewhere between R0 0 1.4 and 1.7.
Further sensitivity analysis shows that the
containment threshold is roughly at R0 0 1.6.
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Fig. 2. Model stochastic realizations. (A) A typical stochastically simulated large influenza epidemic
with no intervention and R0 0 1.4. Also shown are the main intervention initiation times considered
and the number of cases at those intervention times. (B) A typical stochastically simulated influenza
epidemic that is contained using 90% GTAP initiated 14 days after the first case, when R0 0 1.4.
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efficacy vaccine greatly enhances the effec-
tiveness of TAP and GTAP, even with just
50% coverage. With pre-vaccination, both 80%
TAP and 90% GTAP are effective at con-
taining the epidemic when R0 0 1.7, but not
at higher levels of R0. Pre-vaccination es-
sentially lowers the reproductive number (31).
Local household quarantine is effective at
containing the epidemic if R0 e 2.1 but is not
as effective at R0 0 2.4. However, a com-
bination of 80% TAP plus quarantine is ef-
fective at an R0 as high as 2.4, and adding
pre-vaccination makes TAP plus quarantine
even more effective.
We conducted a number of sensitivity
analyses of the effectiveness of the different
interventions at different levels of implementa-
tion and delay (figs. S11 to S18). We found that
at R0 e 1.4, either TAP or GTAP alone is
effective only at the 70% level or higher. At
higher values of R0, household quarantine must
reach the 70% level to be effective. In terms of
timing of the intervention (fig. S14), 90%
GTAP and 80% TAP become less effective
when the intervention starts 28 days or more
after the detection of the first symptomatic
case, when there is an average of 85 cases
already. Quarantine at the 70% level becomes
less effective 42 days (average, 313 cases)
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Fig. 3. The effectiveness of the different interventions as compared to no
intervention started 14days after the firstcase at differentvalues of R0. The
interventions considered are 90% GTAP, 80% TAP, 80% TAP plus 50% pre-
vaccination of the population (80% TAP 50% Pre-Vac), 80% TAP plus 70%
pre-vaccination of the population (80% TAP 70% Pre-Vac), 70% household
and household cluster quarantine (70% Quar), 80% TAP with 70%
household and household cluster quarantine (80% TAP 70% Quar), and
80% TAP plus 50% pre-vaccination of the population with 70% household
and household cluster quarantine (80% TAP 50% Pre-Vac 70% Quar). (A)
Average number of cases per 1000 people with no intervention and with
different interventions. (B) Average containment proportion defined as
the proportion of epidemics with one or more secondary cases that had
500 or fewer cases in the population of 500,000 (or e1 case per 1000).
The ‘‘no intervention’’ entry gives the proportion of these epidemics that
had 500 or fewer cases with no intervention in the population of 500,000
(or e1 case per 1000). (C) Average number of infected people leaving the
500,000-person population. Each day, the number of infected people who
have not withdrawn to the home or are quarantined is multiplied by 10j3,
the probability that a person will travel outside of the 500,000-person area.
(D) Average number of courses of oseltamivir used for the intervention.
R EPORTS
12 AUGUST 2005 VOL 309 SCIENCE www.sciencemag.org 1086after detection of the first case, even with the
addition of TAP. All other interventions in
combination with pre-vaccination would be
fairly effective even 56 days (average, 894
cases) after the detection of the first case.
It may not be practical to get antiviral agents
toexposedpeoplewithin1dayoftheindexcase
developing symptoms. We carried out a sensi-
tivity analysis for delays in initiation of TAP in
the close contact mixing groups ranging from 2
to 5 days after detection of an index case, with
80% TAP. With a delay of up to 2 days, sub-
stantial reduction in the number of cases is still
achieved, but with delays of 3 to 5 days, there is
less benefit (fig. S15). Sensitivity analysis on
antiviral efficacy (figs. S16 to S18) shows that
the effectiveness of TAP and GTAP is moder-
ately sensitive to variation in AVES but not as
much to variation in antiviral efficacy in
preventing symptomatic disease if infected,
AVED.B o t hA V E S and AVEI need to be 0.5
or higher for either TAP or GTAP to be
effective. Sensitivity analysis on VEI shows
that the effectiveness of 80% TAP with 70%
pre-vaccination is sensitive to variation in VEI
(fig. S19). However, even at a level of VEI as
low as 0.1 (fig. S19), the epidemic is still well
contained.
We have shown that the targeted use of
antiviral agents, if implemented within 21 days
of the first case and if R0 e 1.4, would have a
high probability of success for containing an
emergent influenza strain at the source in a
rural SE Asian population. Such interventions
would be effective for R0 values as high as 1.7
in the presence of pre-vaccination with a low-
efficacy vaccine. For higher values of R0,
localized household quarantine would have to
be implemented, possibly in combination with
targeted antiviral prophylaxis to contain the
pandemic at the source. Although the R0 of a
future newly emergent influenza strain is un-
known, previous estimates are 1.89 from the
first epidemic of pandemic A (H3N2) in Hong
Kong (19) and 2 to 3 for 1918 pandemic A
(H1N1) in the United States (32). However, a
newly emergent influenza strain may not yet
be well adapted to humans and could have an
R0 G 2, and possibly just above 1. As the virus
adapts to human-to-human transmission, there
would probably be an incremental increase in
R0 with each transmission event (33). This
makes early intervention especially important.
Based on the results here, the current World
Health Organization stockpile of 120,000 treat-
ment courses could possibly be sufficient to
contain a pandemic if the stockpile were de-
ployed at the source of the emerging strain
within2to3weeksofdetection.Giventhatearly
containmentattheoriginalsourcemayfailorthe
emergent strain may appear simultaneously in
several locations, up to 1 million courses could
be needed to deal with the multiple outbreak
foci. In addition, pre-vaccination of populations
at risk for a newly emergent influenza strain
would be prudent, even if the vaccine provided
only moderate protection. Although the effec-
tiveness of most interventions was fairly in-
variant to the timing of intervention initiation up
to 21 days after the first case, delay much
beyond that could allow the pandemic to spread
unless pre-vaccination takes place.
These results are probabilistic and demon-
strate considerable variability in the potential
size of the epidemic in the absence of and in
response to intervention (34). Public health
officials need to keep this probabilistic char-
acteristic of success in mind when planning
and evaluating their response. We have de-
veloped a flexible mathematical model that
can help determine the best intervention strat-
egies for containing pandemic influenza at
the source. Should a newly emergent influ-
enza strain appear, the model could be quickly
calibrated to data and intervention options
at the source of the epidemic. Data should be
provided from the field to estimate the value
of R0; the serial interval between cases; the
distributions of the latent, incubation, and in-
fectious periods; pathogenicity; case fatality
ratios; and secondary spread within important
mixing groups.
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Table 1. Simulated mean cases, escapes, courses, and containment proportion for various interventions
and no intervention in a typical rural population of 500,000 people in SE Asia.
Intervention
Cases per 1000 Escapes Courses Containment
proportion
R0 0 1.4 R0 0 1.7 R0 0 1.4 R0 0 1.7 R0 0 1.4 R0 0 1.7 R0 0 1.4 R0 0 1.7
No intervention 211 384 686 1254 – – – –
80% TAP 0.13 149 0.43 525 1,042 381,273 0.98 0.33
90% GTAP 0.28 54 1 187 54,834 325,431 0.95 0.59
80% TAP þ 50%
pre-vaccination
0.02 0.16 0.06 0.67 87 1,338 1.00 0.98
80% TAP þ 70%
pre-vaccination
0.01 0.04 0.08 0.12 67 269 1.00 1.00
70% quarantine 0.17 1 0.72 3 - - 0.98 0.57
80% TAP þ
70% quarantine
0.06 0.14 0.18 0.36 484 1,349 1.00 1.00
80% TAP þ 70%
quarantine þ 50%
pre-vaccination
0.02 0.03 0.06 0.17 91 275 1.00 1.00
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